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We analyze the standard New Keynesian economy adjusted by a finan-
cial intermediation sector, heterogenous, imperfect knowledge, and adaptive
learning. We consider two groups of agents (i) private agents (households,
firms, private banks) and (ii) the central bank who differ in their knowledge
and expectations. The monetary-policy transmission is non-trivial in this
environment. The interest rate directly affecting the decisions of households
and firms is influenced by the private banks expectations, and the monetary
policy may get distorted. The basic finding suggests the higher knowledge
heterogeneity, the less active monetary policy should be in order to stabi-
lize the economy. This contrasts the standard literature with homogenous
knowledge and expectations.
Abstrakt
V tomto článku zkoumáme ekonomickou dynamiku v kontextu nového
keynesiánského modelu rozšířeného o finanční sektor, heterogenní, nedokon-
alou informaci a adaptivní učení. Rozlišujeme dvě skupiny ekonomických
agentů: (i) soukromé agenty (domácnosti, firmy a soukromé banky) a (ii) cen-
trální banku. U obou skupin předpokládáme odlišné znalosti a očekávání. V
tomto prostředí už to není centrální banka, která má přímý vliv na ekonomiku,
ale jsou to soukromé banky. Jejich úrokové sazby nyní vstupují do rozhodování
domácností a firem. Trasmise monetární politiky se tak stává netriviální.
Původní záměr centrální banky, např. cílovat inflaci, může být vychýlen
sazbami soukromých bank, které je stanovují na základě vlastní informace a
očekávání. V analýze docházíme k závěru, který je v kontrastu s literaturou
pracující s homegnní, nedokonalou informací. Čím větší je rozdíl znalostí mezi
oběma skupinami agentů, tím méně by měla monetarní politika být aktivní.
Snižuje se tak variabilita ekonomických veličin a zrychluje se konvergence do
ekonomické rovnováhy při dokonalé informaci.





The paper’s objective is to theoretically investigate the question of whether central
bankers should consider private expectations when setting monetary-policy instru-
ments. If they do so, will it lead to an increase in economic stability?
Since private expectations may distort monetary policy actions, we analyze the
question of whether private expectations should affect monetary policy decisions.
In standard models, the homogeneity of expectations is assumed, i.e., the private
sector and central bank have the same knowledge about the economy structure
and form the same expectations. Here the assumption is weakened. We distinguish
between expectations formed by the private sector (here households, firms, and
banks) and by the central bank. Further, the private and central bank’s imperfect
and heterogenous knowledge is adaptively updated.
The analysis is conducted in a dynamic general equilibrium model of the New
Keynesian form which allows for a banking sector. The banking sector plays an
important role in the policy transmission mechanism here.
The main contribution of this paper is the analysis of monetary policy in a
heterogenous knowledge environment. In the standard model set-up, the economy
wide interest rate is predetermined by the central bank. It is predetermined in
the sense that it does not bring any uncertainty to private sector decisions. In
our model, the interest rate relevant for the inflation and output gap dynamics
is determined by the banking sector. The monetary policy still has a stabilizing
role, but now it also depends on the banking sector’s objectives and beliefs when
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determining interest rates. This makes the policy transmission mechanism non-
trivial, and, if the central bank does not know the transmission mechanism, it may
cause policy inefficiency and possibly economic instability.
In the environment outlined above we address the following questions:
1. Should private forecasts concern policy makers?
Given the heterogeneity of expectations in the model, should private expec-
tations enter the policy rule or should the policy rule be based primarily on
the central bank’s beliefs? What are the implications for economic stability?
2. In the heterogenous knowledge environment, should the central bank be more
inflation averse or output gap averse?
Orphanides & Williams (2003) and Ferrero (2003) tend to favor inflation vig-
ilance. It lowers economic variability and speeds up the convergence towards
the rational expectations equilibrium. Both results are, however, derived for
the homogenous expectations case. We reinvestigate this problem in a richer
model and under heterogenous expectations.
3. Does it matter who has better knowledge? On one hand, there are central
banks employing sophisticated techniques to analyze the economy and to
forecast a possible future development. On the other hand, there are private
agents using less sophisticated techniques to produce their own forecasts. We
analyze the situation in which a central bank ignores private forecasts and
bases its policy primarily on its own forecasts. We asses the impact on the
economic variability from the perspective of a knowledge imperfection, eg.
is the economy less volatile if the central bank has ’better’ knowledge than
private agents? The concept of knowledge in this paper is defined below.
A New Keynesian model is the typical environment for studying policy issues
under learning. In this paper, we derive from first principles a new model which
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also explicitly includes a banking sector. Extending the standard model structure
for a credit channel yields a direct impact of monetary policy on inflation. Since,
firms borrow money from banks, the interest paid for the credit becomes the part
of firms’ costs and because the firms have the power to set their output prices, the
interest rate influences prices and inflation. This does not occur in the standard
setup. The introduction of the banking sector is originally motivated by Fuerst
(1992). Ravenna & Walsh (2003) use his approach in the context of the New
Keynesian model.
For simulation purposes, the perpetual learning concept as employed in Or-
phanides & Williams (2003), will be adopted here. The paper by Orphanides &
Williams (2003) is one of the first that investigates the impact of imperfect knowl-
edge and perpetual adaptive learning on macroeconomic dynamics and the conduct
of optimal monetary policy. The authors find two basic results: (i) "policies that
would be efficient under rational expectations can perform poorly when knowledge
is imperfect", Orphanides and Williams (2003, p.26), and (ii) "policy should re-
spond more aggressively to inflation under imperfect knowledge than under perfect
knowledge... in order to anchor inflation expectations and foster macroeconomic
stability", Orphanides and Williams (2003, p.26).
The results are obtained with a very basic model consisting of the Lucas supply
curve and a simple inflation targeting rule. In the light of the simplicity of the
model, Evans (2003) answers the second result above in doubt. For him, there is no
clear answer whether the policy maker should be biased towards inflation vigilance
under imperfect knowledge. However though the answer might be ambiguous, it
has not yet been provided, and we try to provide it here.
Evans & Honkapohja (2003) provide a review and extension of the recent work
on monetary policy under learning. They also investigate, among other items, the
consequences of different beliefs between private agents and policy-makers about
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the true economy structure. They show that certain policy rules allow for E-
stability and determinacy, even if the beliefs of private agents and the central bank
differ. E-stability and determinacy also exist if the cental bank adopts the private
agents’ beliefs when setting its instruments. The same result is found in Bullard &
Mitra (2002).
The authors use the concept of (finite-horizon) Euler-equation learning. Preston
(2004) has addressed the problem from the perspective of infinite learning and
produced different results. In Preston’s approach, if both agents and policy-makers
are learning about the model structure, and the central bank adopts the private
agents expectations for its decisions without how they are formed, than it may result
in a self-fulfilling expectation problem and macroeconomic instability. Preston
argues in favor of policy rules based on the bank’s own forecasts.
Honkapohja, Mitra & Evans (2003) show that the approach of infinite learning in
Preston (2004) does not invalidate results based on the Euler equation learning and
demonstrate that Preston’s approach can be replicated under plausible assumptions
in the Euler-equation learning approach. In this paper we adopt the latter.
The rest of this paper is structured in the following way. In the next section,
a general equilibrium model with a financial intermediation sector and a sticky
prices phenomenon is derived. The model dynamics is aggregated and represented
by the IS and the New Keynesian Phillips curve. In section 3, we introduce the
concept of imperfect and heterogenous knowledge, and the model determinacy and
E-stability properties are examined. We simulate the model for different numerical




The workhorse model follows the standard New Keynesian DSGE schema. On the
one hand, there are households who make decisions about consumption, labour,
and money holdings in order to maximize and smooth their lifetime welfare. On
the other hand, there is a monopolistically competitive production sector that
maximizes profits by controlling output, output prices and labour demand. The
central bank’s objective is characterized by a forward-looking inflation targeting
rule which seeks to anchor the nominal side of the economy.
Borrowing from the RBC literature, we extend otherwise the purely New Key-
nesian model by the sector of financial intermediation. Following Fuerst (1992),
we introduce a financial sector with two frictions. First, all purchases (labour,
consumption goods) have to be paid by cash. Second, decisions about cash-money
holdings are made prior to an exogenous shocks realization. In the RBC literature
such a financial structure helps an RBC model to capture the liquidity effect ob-
served in the data. To make the liquidity effect persistent though, an additional
friction has to be introduced. Christiano & Eichenbaum (1992) and Gust & Chris-
tiano (1999) generate the persistent liquidity effect by making the financial sector
more liquid than the consumption sector, imposing costs on household’s financial
portfolio adjustments.
We introduce the credit sector to the New Keynesian set-up to make the model
structure more plausible. The standard New Keynesian model usually omits finan-
cial intermediation which in reality plays a considerable role in monetary trans-
mission. This is not an original idea. Ravenna & Walsh (2003) analyzed optimal
monetary policy in such a model. We use the same model to analyze its properties
under imperfect, heterogenous knowledge and adaptive learning.
The linearized model characterizing the aggregate economic dynamics is given
by the IS curve (1), Phillips curve (2), private banks’ pricing rules (3), (4), and
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the central bank’s policy rule (5). In the perfect-knowledge environment, the ag-
gregated sticky-price model takes the form





πt = βEtπt+1 + λxt + γi
b







iCBt = θπ (Etπt+1 − π∗) + θxEtxt+1. (5)
The model differs from the standard New Keynesian schema in one aspect. As
the firms face the credit-in-advance constraint, the interest rate does have a direct
impact on inflation since it is a part of the costs the firm has to pay on labour. It is
in contrast to the usual setup where only the IS curve is a function of the interest
rate. In this model, due to the cost channel, monetary policy has a direct effect
not only on the output gap but also on the inflation rate. The derivation of the
model is presented in Appendix A on page 27.
The model (1)-(5) assumes all economic agents have perfect knowledge about
the economy structure and all expectations operators Et(.) = Et(.|Ωt) stand for
the perfect knowledge rational expectations. In our analysis, the assumption that
the complete information set Ωt is available to all agents is relaxed. Instead, we
will assume agents have imperfect and heterogenous knowledge which will affect
the way agents form their expectations. We will consider two groups of agents:
(i) private agents - households, firms, private banks, and (ii) the central bank. In
the following analysis it will be distinguished between the expectation operators
which these two groups form. We will assume expectations’ homogeneity within
each group but heterogeneity between the groups, that is all households, firms and
private banks will share the same set of information and beliefs, but, it differs from
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the information set and beliefs of the central bank. This is a significant relaxation
of the original, homogenous, perfect knowledge set-up.
Consequently, the workhorse model for this paper takes the form
xt = Ê
P









t πt+1 + λxt + γi
CB
t + ut, (7)
iCBt = θπ
(





where it is specifically distinguished for the form of expectations formed by private
agents, ÊPt (.) = Et(.|ΩPt ), and by the central bank ÊCBt (.) = Et(.|ΩCBt ), where
ΩPt , Ω
CB
t ⊂ Ωt. Honkapohja et al. (2003) show that the move from the perfect
knowledge model to the imperfect and heterogenous knowledge model is possible
under the so called Euler-equation learning. If all agents are adaptively learn-
ing (using recursive least squares), the originally heterogenous knowledge ΩPt ΩCBt
enriches over time so that it converges to the perfect knowledge set Ωt.
3 Model Analysis Under Adaptive Learning
Besides the imperfect knowledge and heterogeneity between the private agents’
and central bank’s expectations, we also assume agents are adaptively learning,
i.e., they are improving their knowledge about the economy over time, and upon
the past mistakes they made in the anticipation of economic movements. Under
certain conditions, if all agents are improving their knowledge over time, the econ-
omy converges to the perfect knowledge case eventually. In this light the perfect
knowledge case, the rational expectations equilibrium (REE), is a special case of an
imperfect knowledge environment.
As will be shown below, the minimum-state representation to the structural
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model (6)-(8) is
Yt = a + bst + cst−1,
where Yt is the vector of endogenous variables, st is the vector of exogenous shocks,
and {a, b, c} are the matrices of the structural parameters.
If we say the agents have imperfect and heterogenous knowledge, we assume the
agents’ perception of the economy does not correspond to the perfect knowledge
case and further, the knowledge differs between the agents. It is assumed the






t st + ĉ
P
t st−1,





t st + ĉ
CB
t st−1.
where {âit, b̂it, b̂it} ∈ Ωit for i = {P, CB} are the time-varying matrices of the model
primitives. We implicitly assume here, agents have perfect knowledge about the
economy structure, i.e., they know what the right-hand side variables are, but
they have imperfect knowledge about the true values of model primitives. Though,
they are learning about the structural matrices {a, b, c} over time. The learning
mechanism is based on recursive least squares, the principle of Kalman filtering.














where i = {P,CB}, ξit = [vec(âi)′vec(b̂i)′vec(ĉi)′]′ the (21x1) vector of the perceived-
law-of-motion parameters, Xt is the (21x3) matrix of appropriately stacked exoge-
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nous shocks st and st−1, Rit is the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters,
and κit is the information gain.
Definition 1. Knowledge heterogeneity Agents in the model (6)-(8) differ in their
knowledge of the structural parameters, and in the speed of updating their knowl-
edge. The individual information sets are defined as
ΩPt = {âPt , b̂Pt , b̂Pt κPt , st, st−1},
ΩCBt = {âCBt , b̂CBt , b̂CBt κCBt , st, st−1}.
To analyze the conditions under which the imperfect knowledge model (6)-
(10) converges to the REE equilibrium, the methodology developed by Evans &
Honkapohja (2001) is employed. In principle the methodology consists of two
parts. First, the rational expectation equilibrium of a given model is examined.
We look for conditions under which the REE is determined. The REE equilibrium
is called to be determined if it is found unique and stabile. The second part of
the methodology is the check for the learnability of REE. The question is, if the
economic agents have imperfect knowledge, can they learn, given a learning mech-
anism, the true RE dynamics? Throughout the paper the recursive, least-squares
(econometric) learning mechanism (34)-(35) is considered. The conditions that
guarantee the REE is attainable under the adaptive learning mechanism are called
the E-stability conditions. For technical details on the methodology we refer to
Evans & Honkapohja (2001) and Evans & Honkapohja (2003) where the adaptive
learning in a homogenous environment is examined and to Honkapohja & Mitra
(2003) for the methodology on heterogenous learning.
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3.1 REE Determinacy
To examine the rational expectation equilibrium of the model (6)-(8) we begin with
rewriting the model into a matrix structural form:
Yt = A0 + A1Ê
P
t Yt+1 + A2Ê
CB
t Yt+1 + A3Ê
P
t−1Yt + A4Yt + st, (11)


































The properties of ut and vt determine st so that it follows an AR(1) process st =


















recalling that we assume ρA = ρc = ρ and νvt =
σ(1+φ)(1−ρA)
1+σφ
νAt − σ(1+ρc−2σφ)1+σφ νct .
The reduced form to the structural model (36) is
Yt = M0 + M1Ê
P
t Yt+1 + M2Ê
CB
t Yt+1 + M3Ê
P
t−1Yt + Pst, (12)
where M0 = PM0, M1 = PA1, M2 = PA2, M3 = PA3, and P = (I − A4)−1.
To analyze the REE determinacy, we will assume for now a perfect knowledge
environment, ÊPt (.) = ÊCBt (.) = Et(.). Et−1Yt can be rewritten as Yt = Et−1Yt +ηt,
where ηt is the innovation term which under the REH follows a stationary process.
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Given that and rearranging the reduced form one obtains
Yt = C + MEtYt+1 + Qst + QA3ηt, (13)
where C = QA0, M = Q(A1 + A2), and Q = (I − A3 − A4)−1.
Proposition 1. The model (6)-(8) has a unique and stabile rational expectations
equilibrium if the modulus of the eigenvalues of matrix M in (38) lies inside the
unit circle.
Proof follows from the properties of the stable FODE system.
3.2 E-Stability
The second issue is to analyze the conditions under which the REE is learnable. We
will follow the methodology by Evans & Honkapohja (2003) for the heterogenous
adaptive learning based on recursive least squares. If the REE is determined, the
model has the minimum state variable (MSV) representation
Yt = a + bst + cst−1. (14)
a, b, and c are the (3x1) and (3x3) matrices of the model primitives. Their exact
form is derived in Appendix B on page 38.
Next suppose, the agents have the following perceived law of motion (PLM).





t st + ĉ
P
t st−1, (15)









The subscript t at matrices indicates the time dependence of the matrices as the
agents are learning using (9)-(10). The private agents and central bank use their
PLMs to form expectations











t F + ĉ
P
t )st−1, (18)




t F + ĉ
CB
t )st. (19)
Substituting (17)-(19) back to the reduced form (12), one obtains the economy’s
actual law of motion
Yt =
[











t F + ĉ
P
t ) + M2(b̂
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The mapping from PLM to ALM is formalized to
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The E-stability is determined by the differential equation
d
dτ
(a, b, c) = T [a, b, c]− (a, b, c). (22)
Evans & Honkapohja (2001) prove the E-stability exists if (22) is locally stable.
Honkapohja & Mitra (2003) and Evans & Honkapohja (2003) show the map (21)
can be simplified. They show the E-stability conditions in the case of heterogenous
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expectations are equivalent (under least squares learning) to the homogenous ex-
pectations case. Thus (46), assuming ĵPt = ĵCBt = ĵt for j = {a, b, c}, simplifies
to
T [a, b, c] =
[




Proposition 2. The REE of the model (6)-(10) is E-stable under heterogenous
expectations if and only if the corresponding model with homogenous expectations
is E-stable. Hence the modulus of eigenvalues of
DTa(a) = I ⊗ (M1 + M2 + M3)
DTb(b) = F
′ ⊗ (M1 + M2)
DTc(c) = I ⊗M3
must lie inside the unit circle.
Proof see Evans & Honkapohja (2003) for the proof of the first statement and
Appendix C on page 40 for the derivation of DTa(a), DTb(b), and DTc(c).
3.3 Numerical Evaluation of the Conditions
Since M is a (3x3) matrix, it is easier to evaluate the REE determinacy and E-
stability conditions numerically. Ravenna & Walsh (2003) estimate the model
(6)-(8) on US data. Since their results are very close to Clarida, Gali & Gertler
(2000) we combine them to calibrate the model. We set β = 0.99, λ = 0.075, σ = 4,
θ = 0.75. The implied value of γ = (1−θ)(1−θβ)
θ
is 0.08.
The numerical evaluation of the determinacy and E-stability conditions for our
workhorse model (6)-(10) are summarized in Figure 1. For comparison, we also
report results on how the conditions change if the credit channel is closed (γ = 0),
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i.e., firms are not required to pay wages in advance. The results are summarized
in Figure 2. We can see they are equivalent to the results obtained by Bullard &
Mitra (2002).
Figure 1: Numerical evaluation of the REE determinacy and E-stability conditions
when γ = 0.08. Legend: [1] determinate and E-stable, [2] indeterminate and E-
stable, [3] determinate and E-unstable, [4] indeterminate and E-unstable region.
Figure 2: Numerical evaluation of the REE determinacy and E-stability conditions
when the credit channel is closed (γ = 0). Legend: [1] determinate and E-stable,
[2] indeterminate and E-stable, [3] indeterminate and E-unstable region.
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From the graphical evaluation of the conditions it follows, the central bank has
a considerably limited manoeuvering space for setting its policy rule. The model
without a banking sector implies the central bank has the option to set its θπ and
θx in the ranges of (1, 12) and (0, 0.5), respectively.1 In the model with the banking
sector this is already considerably less. To impose determinacy and E-stability, θπ
and θx must be within (1, 3.5) and 0.1, 0.5), respectively. In this light the calibration
of policy rule (8) where θπ = 1.5 and θx = 0.5, often used in the literature, puts
the model equilibrium on the edge of determinacy and E-stability. In simulations
below we choose θx = 0.4 to be within the E-stability and determinacy region.
4 Model simulation
In this section, we focus on the two research questions asked in the introductory
part, i.e., (i) does it help to decrease the economic variability if the central bank has
better knowledge?, and (ii) should the central bank be more inflation or output-gap
averse in order to lower the economic variability? In the fashion of Orphanides
& Williams (2003), the questions will be addressed using simulations based on
constant-gain learning. The simulation results on economic variability implied by
different model settings are summarized in Table 1 and 3. Appendix D on page 41
contains details on the simulation.
Given the amount of simulation results, we focus on summary statistics of eco-
nomic variability. We call this variability as implied by the learning process. Even
an economy without being subject to exogenous shocks can fluctuate. This is given
by the knowledge heterogeneity and adaptive learning of agents. Any difference of
expectations from the reality causes shock (surprise) and implies economic fluctu-
ations (adjustments). The results below are obtained by assuming no exogenous
shock to the economy, i.e., σ2u = σ2v = 0. The implied economic system variability
1The upper limits obviously depend on the model numerical calibration.
16
is the reaction on learning. Detailed results on parameters’ estimates and their
standard errors can be obtained, together with the codes generating those results,







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.1 Does better knowledge matter?
This question is analytically examined in forthcoming Fukac (2005) where we look
at the speed of convergence to the REE from the perspective of heterogenous knowl-
edge, adaptive learning, and monetary policy set-up. In this section, we present
numerical results which have motivated the closer analytical investigation on this
problem.
The use of the term knowledge might seem to be misleading. In fact, what is
called knowledge below can be also viewed as a willingness to learn. The higher
the κ’s value, the higher willingness to adjust a model. The employed terminology
is motivated by the numerical experiment specification. The REE is considered as
the initial economic state. Assigning different values to κi causes a deviation from
the REE. κi being the Kalman gain, it reflects accumulated knowledge. The lower
its value the more information is accumulated.
In Table 1 we can observe the following patterns. (i) If the private agents have
better knowledge than the central bank, i.e., κP < κCB, the implied economic
variability by the learning process is low. The variability is slightly increasing
with the knowledge difference, however not in a significant way. This holds for all
the settings of policy parameters considered. (ii) If the private agents have worse
knowledge than the central bank, i.e., κP > κCB, the economic variability implied
by the learning process itself is considerably higher than in the previous case. The
variability is, however, decreasing with the lower knowledge difference. Again, as
knowledge is becoming homogenous (κP = κCB = 0.1), the implied variability is
the lowest.
Table 3 contains somewhat surprising results. (i) When the central bank has
better knowledge than the private agents the variability is relatively high. It in-
creases dramatically as the private agents’ knowledge is worsening relatively to
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the central bank’s knowledge. (ii) Remarkably, when the central bank has worse
knowledge than the private agents (κP < κCB = 0.1), the implied variability is low
(increasing as the knowledge is getting homogenous), which is exactly the oppo-
site what is found for the central bank case in Table 1. When the central bank
has worse knowledge than the private sector, with the knowledge homogenization,
the implied economic variability lowers. However, when the private agents have
better knowledge, the knowledge homogenization is increasing the variability. The
observations are robust to all policy settings considered.
The results favor the case of knowledge homogeneity. When the private agents
and central bank share the same knowledge, the implied economic variability is
low, even if the knowledge is not perfect, e.g., κ = 0.1. On the other hand,
knowledge heterogeneity may cause problems. Big differences in knowledge imply
considerably high economic fluctuations, especially if the knowledge asymmetry
favors the central bank. Interestingly, high economic volatility does not occur if
the private agents exhibit better knowledge than the central bank.
4.2 Inflation or output gap hawkiness?
Now we evaluate the results in Table 1 and 3 from the perspective of monetary
policy setting.
θπ = 1.5 and θx = 0.4 is the policy configuration which delivers the lowest
implied economic variability for all states of knowledge in the economy. This will
be our benchmark. If the policy is tougher on inflation (θπ = 2 and θx = 0.4), the
economic variability implied by learning increases. In the case where private agents
have worse knowledge than the central bank (Table 1, κP = 0.1), the variability
even doubles. In Table 3, the increase is not as significant.
When the policy is less focused on the output gap stabilization, i.e., θπ = 1.5 and
θx = 0.2, it yields considerably higher variability, with respect to the benchmark
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case, and the private agents having worse knowledge than the central bank (Table
1, κP = 0.1). The variability is about the same when the situation is reverse (Table
3, κCB = 0.1).
When the central bank prefers inflation stabilization over the output gap stabi-
lization, i.e., θπ = 2 and θx = 0.2, there are some gains and the variability lowers in
comparison to the benchmark in Table 1. In Table 3, where the private agents have
better knowledge than the central bank, the result is reverse, i.e., the variability
increases with a tougher policy on inflation.
To sum up, the policy configuration θπ = 1.5 and θx = 0.4 is robust and delivers
the lowest economic variability implied by the learning process. A different policy
setting does not seem to deliver better results. There is no evidence the central
bank ought to prefer to be inflation hawk to the output gap hawk. It is common
for both cases though, when θπ = 1.5 or 2, to be less output gap averse which
increases the variability.
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5 Summary and Conclusion
In recent years, one can observe a rising interest of economists in the question of
optimal monetary policy in an imperfect and heterogenous knowledge environment.
The central question asked in this paper ’Should private expectations concern cen-
tral bankers?’ is common to most of the literature. Here, the question has been
reviewed form a slightly different perspective.
Borrowing from the RBC literature, we have extended the standard New Key-
nesian for a financial intermediation sector which in reality plays an important role
in policy transmission. In the theory, it is often omitted. Since, in the model,
private banks have to form expectations about the future central bank’s actions in
order to price their products, misperceiving future policy actions may cause distor-
tions in monetary policy actions, which would have consequences for the economic
dynamics.
The workhorse model consists, in a standard way, of the IS curve which captures
the output gap dynamics, the Phillips curve describing the inflation dynamics, and
the policy rule. The model differs from the standard New Keynesian set-up in one
important way. The interest rate does influence not only the output gap but it
affects directly the inflation dynamics as well. Consequently, the monetary policy
leading to the REE determinacy and E-stability is very restricted in this model.
The central bank has only limited maneuvering space for the inflation and output
gap stabilization, in comparison for instance to Bullard & Mitra (2002).
The simulation results suggest ’the world is simpler if knowledge and beliefs
are homogenous ’. The functioning of homogenous-knowledge models is well un-
derstood. For instance, the recommendation of being inflation and output gap
hawk can be applied. If the knowledge is homogenous, it helps to speed up the
learning of the REE dynamics.2 If knowledge and beliefs are heterogenous, the
2Ferrero (2003) provides an excellent analysis in this respect.
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results suggest the policy ought not to be hawkish neither towards inflation nor
the output gap. Since it leads to a higher implied economic variability, it prolongs
the learning process of REE and potentially may lead to an instability (depending
on the knowledge heterogenity magnitude). For the central bank to play its role
effectively in the heterogenous information world and help the economy converge
to the first best equilibrium, it ought to be conservative in its actions and focus its
policy on the information and knowledge homogenization in the economy.
In principle, there are two possibilities to do this. First, the central bank can
adopt, in its policy function, expectations of the private sector. This is the simplest
way. This, however, brings the requirement the central bank is able to observe
(measure) the true market expectations. Certainly, this may not be as simple as
it seems. Expectations census may raise unreliable data. The second possible
solution to the homogenous expectations problem is that the private sector adopts
in its decision rules the central bank’s expectations. The central bank forms its
own forecasts which disseminates across the economy, and the private agents accept
them as their own. This confirms good communication with the private sector, and
policy credibility is the key issue for policy effectiveness and optimality.
To go one way or another, private agents’ expectations ought to concern central
bankers. To know their exact form improves the policy quality. If central banks
base their policy on their own beliefs without appropriately revealing them, it may
cause excess economic variability.
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In this appendix we derive the model (1)-(5) from first principles.
Agents
Households The households’ objective is to maximize lifetime utility. The
consumption bundle, ct, and leisure, (1 − Nt), deliver the utility. To meet the
objective, a household does not only decide about how much to consume and how
much to work, but it also decides about how much money to hold, since money is
the means of transaction in this economy and serves the consumption-smoothing
purposes. Households face two constraints in their decisions. First, following Fuerst
(1992), they need to hold cash in advance in order to purchase consumption goods.
The decision about M ct is made at the end of the period t− 1. Disposable income
in period t is WtNt, where Wt is the nominal wage and Nt is the hours worked. A
budget constraint is second constraint the households face. It equates the current
period income from labour (WtNt), financial assets (M ct + (1 + idt )Mdt ) and the
ownership of firms (Πft ) and banks (Πbt), to the value of current period consumption
(Ptct) and financial portfolio carried to the next period (Mt+1). The representative



















M ct + WtNt ≥ Ptct, (25)
Mt+1 + Ptct = M
c























ε−1 with ct(i) being the consumption of differentiated






1−ε is the corresponding nominal price index,
with Pt(i) being the price of the differentiated good i. Nt is the hours worked, M ct is
cash money, Mdt is deposit money, Π
f
t is the profit coming from the firm ownership,
Πbt is the profit from the bank ownership, Wt is the nominal wage, and idt is the
nominal return on the deposit money. εct is the preference shock which is assumed
to follow an AR(1) process εct = ρcεct−1 + νct , with νct being iid with zero mean and
finite variance, and 0 < ρc < 1. β, φ and ψ are scalars between 0 and 1, and σ > 1.























t + WtNt − Ptct)
+λ2,t
[








t − Ptct −M ct+1 −Mdt+1
]
.







t)− λ1,tPt − λ2,tPt = 0 (28)
∂L(.)
∂Nt
= −βtψNφt + λ1,tWt + λ2,tWt = 0 (29)
∂L(.)
∂Mdt+1
= −λ2,t + (1 + idt+1)λ2,t+1 = 0 (30)
∂L(.)
∂M ct+1
= −λ2,t + λ1,t+1 + λ2,t+1 = 0 (31)


























Having the relation for the aggregate consumption, we also have to solve for the

















where Ptct are the expenditures on the consumption bundle ct, and Pt(i) is the price







In summary, constraints (25)-(27) and equations (32),(33), and (36) describe
the household’s optimal decisions.
Firms Firms operate in a monopolistically competitive environment. As such,
to maximize their profits, they choose how much to produce, what price to charge,
and how much labour to demand. Following the timing in Fuerst (1992), man-
agement’s decisions are taken after the shocks to the economy are realized. We
assume labour is the only production factor. To start production, a firm goes to
the labour market to hire workers. Once the output is produced, the labour is paid
out. The firm goes to a bank and applies for a credit to cover the wage bill. When
the revenues from selling the output are collected, the firm re-pays the credit and
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transfers its net financial position to households.










where Πft (i) = Pt(i)yt(i) −WtNt(i) − ibtBt is the firm’s i nominal profit and Φt+1
is the stochastic discount factor defined as βt+1/(ct+1Pt+1).3 Nt(i) is the labour
demanded by the firm i, Pt(i) is the firm-specific price charged on the output yt(i),
Bt(i) is the demand for credit, and ibt is the interest rate paid for the credit. Note
that the firm’s problem is in fact static and thus the firm maximizes only Πft (i)
subject to







WtNt(i) ≤ Bt(i). (40)
(38) is the firm’s production function where labour is the only production factor.





t is the aggregate technology shock, νAt is iid, zero mean and finite
variance disturbance, 0 < ρA < 1. (39) is the demand function for the consumption
good ct(i) the firm produces. The firm also faces a cash-in-advance constraint (40)
which requires to pay wages in advance, i.e., after the output was produced but
before it is sold.
Since in equilibrium (40) holds with equality, we substitute all the constraints
3It follows that if the firm acts in the best interest of the shareholder, the discount factor
corresponds to the representative household’s relative valuation of consumption across time.
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Rearranging it and using constraints (38)-(40) gives a set of conditions character-












Bt(i) = WtNt(i). (43)
MCt are the firm’s nominal marginal costs, MCt =
(1+ibt)WtNt(i)
yt(i)
. (41) is the stan-
dard pricing rule in the monopolistic competition. The price is a fixed markup over
marginal costs, (42) is the labour demand, and (43) constitutes the credit demand
function. Note that these conditions characterize the firm’s optimal behavior in a
frictionless environment.
To introduce a persistence into the prices in the model, Calvo’s pricing scheme
is assumed. The production sector is monopolistically competitive and as such has
control over prices. Calvo’s pricing mechanism assumes that in every period only
a fraction of firms, θ ∈ (0, 1), can adjust its price. The rest of the firms, (1 − θ),
charge the same price as in the previous period. θ is often viewed as a price-
stickiness measure. The higher its value, the higher the degree of price persistence.
Since the pricing mechanism is well known and described in the literature, we will
limit ourselves to its optimal solution.
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Introducing Calvo’s pricing mechanism, the firm’s problem is no longer a static
one. If a firm i is allowed to change price in period t, it chooses to charge the
optimal price




which is the discounted sum of the future expected marginal cost. Since we are
in a monopolistically competitive environment, note that the marginal cost here
meets the first order condition (41). This specification fully corresponds to the one
employed in Gali & Gertler (1999). β is the subjective discount factor from the
households problem. In this specification, the firm takes into account the possibility
it might not be allowed to change the price for some time from now on.
Introducing the price persistence in the economy, the set of conditions (41)-
(43) characterizing the firm’s optimal behavior in a monopolistically competitive
environment is extended by the time dependent Calvo pricing rule (44). The firm
applies it only if it wins the lottery and is allowed to change the price. Otherwise
the firm charges the same price as in the previous period.
At this point, it is useful to determine the aggregate price level since later we
will be particularly interested in the aggregate dynamics. As stated above, the









The aggregate level in the sticky-price environment is a weighted average of past
prices and new prices. The weights are given by the portion of firms allowed to
change the prices. The aggregate price level becomes
Pt =
[




In summary, in the frictionless environment, the optimal behavior of firm is
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given by equations (41)-(43). If the Calvo pricing rule is introduced, (44) also
applies. It is employed if the firm is allowed to change its price. Otherwise, it
charges the price from the last period.
Banking Sector The role of the competitive banking sector is two-fold. First,
to collect deposits from households and, second, to provide credit to firms. The
operation schedule of the private bank is as follows. The bank enters the period
t with the deposit money from the households. The only money source in the
economy is the central bank. Once the shocks to the economy are realized, and
the central bank makes its decision about the policy rate, and firms decide on their
production and credit demand, the private bank goes to the central bank and (i)
puts the collected deposit money into its accounts and (ii) asks for a credit to cover
the firms’ demand. The central bank charges the same interest rate on both the
deposit money and credit.
Households visit a bank before exogenous shocks are realized, i.e., at the end of
period t − 1. A private bank collects deposits and puts them on interest-bearing
accounts at the central bank. As the central bank sets its rates after shocks are
realized and the private bank has to sign contracts before that, the private bank
has to form expectations about the central bank’s future rate. From the perfect








where ibt is the interest rate charged on the credit provided to the firms, and idt is
the interest rate offered on deposits.
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Monetary Authority The monetary policy, in order to anchor the nominal
side of the economy, is assumed to follow the targeting rule
iCBt = θπ (Etπt+1 − π∗) + θxEtxt+1, (48)
where iCBt is the policy instrument, πt+1 is the inflation rate between periods t and
t + 1, xt+1 is the output gap in the t + 1 period (see the definition below), π∗ is the
inflation target. The target is set exogenously by the central bank and constitutes
a nominal anchor to the economy. According to the rule, the central bank sets
its policy instrument iCBt on the basis of expected deviation of inflation from the
target in the next period, and the expected output gap. θπ and θx characterize
the bank’s preferences with respect to inflation stabilization and/or to the output
gap stabilization. The higher value of θ’s, the more vigilant the bank is. The
reason for the choice of policy rule (48) is twofold. First, the choice is motivated
by the empirical evidence by Clarida et al. (2000) who argue for this type of rule.
Second, Bullard & Mitra (2002) find that this type of rule is robust to deliver the
rational expectations equilibrium determinacy and E-stability, which is required for
the analysis below.
Model Equilibrium
Definition 2. The flexible-price equilibrium is given by an allocation
{ct, Nt,Mdt+1,M ct+1, Bt}∞t=0 and set of {Pt, Pt(i), ibt , idt , iCBt }∞t=0 such that
1. households maximize their lifetime welfare (24) subject to constraints (25)-
(26);
2. monopolistically competitive firms maximize their present-value profit (37)
constrained by (38)-(40);
3. perfect competitive private banks maximize their profit;
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4. central bank meets its inflation target and zero-output-gap objectives; and
5. labour market, money market, and goods market clear.
Definition 3. The sticky-price equilibrium is given by an allocation
{ct, Nt,Mdt+1,M ct+1, Bt}∞t=0 and set of {Pt, Pt(i), ibt , idt , iCBt }∞t=0 such that
1. households maximize their lifetime welfare (24) subject to constraints (25)-
(26);
2. monopolistically competitive firms maximize their present-value profit (37)
constrained by (39)-(40), and Calvo’s pricing principle allows the firm to set
an optimal price according to (44) if it is allowed to change its price, otherwise
Pt(i) = Pt−1(i) ;
3. perfect competitive private banks maximize their profit;
4. central bank meets its inflation target and zero-output-gap objectives; and
5. labour market, money market, and goods market clear.
Log-Linearized Model and Aggregate Equilibrium
From now on we focus our attention particularly on the aggregate dynamics. We
log-linearize the sticky-price model and describe its aggregate-level dynamics. Be-
cause we concentrate specifically on the dynamics of output and inflation, we con-
centrate on the IS and Phillips curves.
First we derive the IS curve which characterizes the dynamics of output around
its steady state. The derivation is straightforward and follows the same strategy
as Ravenna & Walsh (2003) and Malik (2004). We log-linearize the Euler equation
from the household’s problem (33) to get
ct = Etct+1 − σ(idt − Etπt+1) + σεct . (49)
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From the market clearing condition it follows that ct = yt. If we define the output
gap as xt = yt − yft , then (49) becomes
xt = Etxt+1 − σ(idt − Etπt+1 − rft ) + σεct ,
where rft is the real interest rate that arises in the frictionless equilibrium and y
f
t




















− ln ψ + (1 + φ)εAt + εct − id,ft
]
,
where id,ft is the nominal interest rate in the frictionless equilibrium. For compu-
tational convenience and without loss of generality, we will assume that this rate
is equal to zero.
Eliminating rft from the above equation for the output gap we get
xt = Etxt+1 − σ(idt − Etπt+1) + vt, (50)
where vt = σ(1+φ)(1−ρA)1+σφ ε
A
t − σ(1+ρc−2σφ)1+σφ εct . Recalling the properties of εAt and εct
and further assuming ρA = ρc = ρ, vt follows an AR(1) process4. Equation (50)
constitutes the IS curve as a function of expected future output gap and the ex
ante real interest rate.
Second, we derive for the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Log-linearizing and
combining (44) and (45) we obtain








t − σ(1+ρc−2σφ)1+σφ νct .
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where mct is the log of real marginal costs. To eliminate the marginal costs, we
plug in (41) to (42) and divide both sides by Pt; we obtain the real marginal costs.
Log-linearizing that under the perfect knowledge assumption gives
mct = wt − pt + ibt − εAt . (52)




yt − (1 + φ)εAt + ibt .











− ln ψ + εct .
Substituting this expression back to (51) gives the New Keynesian Phillips curve
πt = βEtπt+1 + λxt + γi
b
t + ut, (53)
where γ = (1−θ)(1−θβ)
θ
, λ = γ 1+σφ
σ






Using the method of undetermined coefficients, we derive the exact form of the
minimum state variable (MSV) representation for the model considered in the
text. Starting with the reduced form (12) and assuming rational expectations,
i.e., ÊPt (.) = ÊCBt (.) = Et(.), we get
yt = M0 + (M1 + M2)Etyt+1 + M3Et−1yt + Pεt, (54)
where
εt = Fεt−1 + εt.
Now assume the MSV form takes the form
yt = a + bεt + cεt−1. (55)
Taking the appropriate expectations needed in (54) one obtains
Etyt+1 = a + (bF + c)εt,
Et−1yt = a + (bF + c)εt−1.
Plugging these expectations back into (54) yields
yt = M0 + (M1 + M2 + M3)a + [(M1 + M2)(bF + c) + P ]εt + M3(bF + c)εt−1. (56)
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Using the method of undetermined coefficients, it follows that the MSV solution
must satisfy
M0 + (M1 + M2 + M3)a = a,
(M1 + M2)(bF + c) + P = b,
M3(bF + c) = c.
Solving for the matrices a, b, and c we get
a = (I −M1 −M2 −M3)−1M0, (57)
vec(b) = [I− F ′ ⊗ (M1 + M2)− F ′ ⊗ (M1 + M2)(I −M3)−1M3]−1vec(P ),
(58)
c = (I −M3)−1M3bF. (59)
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Appendix C
Here we derive the matrices used in Proposition 2 on page 14.
Having the map from the PLMs to ALM
T [a, b, c] =
[
M0 + (M1 + M2 + M3)ât, P + (M1 + M2)(b̂tF + ĉt),M3(b̂tF + ĉt)
]
.
we take derivatives with respect to ât, b̂t, and ĉt. Using the rules for the derivatives









P + (M1 + M2)(b̂t + ĉt)
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Here the details on simulation results are provided. The results presented below
are obtained for the following numerical calibration: β = 0.99, λ = 0.075, σ = 4,
γ = 0.1, θπ = 1.5, θx = 0.4, π∗ = 0, ρ = 0.8, σvν = 0.1, σcν = 0.2.
The REE Model Dynamics
Given the numerical calibration, we simulate the impulse response function for the
standard New Keynesian model and for the credit channel extension. The impulse
responses to the productivity and demand shocks are summarized in Figure 3. In
Table ,3 we report on the moments, correlation and autocorrelation of the simulated
variables. The numbers are obtained for 5,000 replications.















































Figure 3: Impulse response functions when the credit channel is opened (γ = 0.1)
and closed (γ = 0).
The economy with the credit channel opened is less responsive to the exogenous
shocks than the economy where the channel is closed. The only exception is the
response of output gap to the technology shock, which is about as twice as big in
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contrast to the no-credit market economy. Surprisingly, the credit channel does not
affect the persistence of any model variable. Indeed, this holds only ceteris paribus.
A detailed investigation on the model properties we leave for future research.
Table 3: Moments, correlation, and autocorrelation of simulated variables
Correlation Autocorrelation (lag)
Mean Std x π iCBt 1 2 3 4 5
γ = 0
std(x) 0 1.77 1 -0.99 -0.99 0.85 0.72 0.62 0.53 0.44
std(π) 0 1.56 1 0.99 0.85 0.72 0.62 0.53 0.44
std(i) 0 1.39 1 0.84 0.72 0.62 0.52 0.44
γ = 0.1
std(x) 0 2.79 1 -0.99 -0.98 0.85 0.72 0.61 0.52 0.44
std(π) 0 2.47 1 0.99 0.84 0.73 0.62 0.52 0.44
std(i) 0 2.21 1 0.85 0.73 0.62 0.53 0.44
Imperfect Knowledge Experiment Results (details)
In Figures 4 - 11 below, we present detailed simulation results on inflation, output
gap, interest rate variability and mean-square forecast errors (MSFE) of private
agents and central bank. The results are obtained for time series of 100 observations
and 500 experiments. The summary results presented in the paper are based on
these simulations. One observation follows immediately, there is no monotone
relation between κCBt , κPt and std(.) or MSFEP (.). Other observations can be
summarized as:
1. The policy parameter combination {1.5, 0.4} appears to be the most effec-
tive in delivering the lowest variation in inflation and output gap, although
for some combinations of {κCB, κP} a higher value of θπ may deliver better
results. These cases are marginal though.
2. The policy parameter combination {1.5, 0.4} appears to help the forecast










































































Case 1:    θπ = 1.5    θx = 0.4
Case 2:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.4
Case 3:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.2




































































Case 1:    θπ = 1.5    θx = 0.4
Case 2:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.4
Case 3:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.2










































































Case 1:    θπ = 1.5    θx = 0.4
Case 2:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.4
Case 3:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.2















































































Case 1:    θπ = 1.5    θx = 0.4
Case 2:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.4
Case 3:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.2














































































Case 1:    θπ = 1.5    θx = 0.4
Case 2:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.4
Case 3:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.2














































































Case 1:    θπ = 1.5    θx = 0.4
Case 2:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.4
Case 3:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.2















































































Case 1:    θπ = 1.5    θx = 0.4
Case 2:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.4
Case 3:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.2











































































Case 1:    θπ = 1.5    θx = 0.4
Case 2:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.4
Case 3:    θπ = 2      θx = 0.2
Case 4:    θπ = 1.5   θx = 0.2  
Figure 11:
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